Israel (now broader Mid East discussion)
Let me put it another way. If the starting point is that "targeting schools and killing large numbers of civilians is a war crime," then literally any of the military actions that the IDF has carried out that didn't target schools or kill huge numbers of civilians would generally qualify as 'not a war crime' on that basis. And while you could add other protected areas like 'hospitals' to schools, I would think most people would recognise that would still leave a vast array of actions that did neither of those things.
Which would make your question essentially, "list military actions that don't target schools or kill huge numbers of civilians." But that seems like too broad a question - surely everyone agrees there are military actions that don't target schools or kill large numbers of civilians? - to be of any use.
Which is why I asked if you agree that the IDF can engage without targeting schools or killing large numbers of civilians. Because if you do, then why you do need someone to describe specific actions that don't do that? "List everything that isn't a war crime," seems a lot less pertinent than, "list things that are a war crime."
Hmmm.
And not "hmmm" because I have to hesitate about your specific question. That's pretty easy; I agree that they can do as you propose (although there is still fuzziness around what constitutes "huge numbers of civilians", but I'm happy to Justice Potter that for purposes of this discussion). But rather the real bugaboo is the question following on to that easy answer of "yes, they can". And that is the age-old question of:
at what cost? To me, the bigger challenge is indeed the specific answers to THAT question.
I get WhoDatPhan78's position. I disagree with its simplicity, but the finality with which he staked out his one-sided position precludes any further worthwhile discussion there for me personally.
Rather, in trying to form a definitive opinion in my own mind, I struggle more with all of the unknowns and the recency bias associated with them. Just as a single (and incredibly abbreviated) example of one unknown and its interplay with recency bias as it plays in my own head:
Take as a given (not objectively so, but rather subjectively since it's between my ears that we're talking about) that there is either a) an ethical underpinning to Israel's initial decision to go all-in; or b) a la 9/11, Israel's understandable fury has led them to grabbing an increasingly toothless tiger by the tail. In this resultant conflict, certainly Hamas will not stop its practice of intermingling with civilians for its own survival or longevity. And equally certainly, the IDF has calculated, in some form or fashion, the repeated impact on its forces (and, potentially, that of the human shields themselves) caused by taking Hamas strongpoints building-by-building with infantry, as opposed to simply blowing them and all of their guilty and innocent inhabitants to smithereens. And perhaps their (naturally biased) calculations show the associated losses to the IDF to be unsustainable in the context of future potential conflicts with Hezbollah, Iran, etc. and thus an issue, in their minds, of continued national existence. Calculations similarly made, for example, by the architects of Operation Downfall, and the USAAF and RAF European Theatre air groups.
And then further, from the Israeli mindset, reference the world's current lack of (and, for that matter, always non-existent) outrage regarding Dresden and the firebombing of Tokyo (in the context of the known lack of war production impact), or Hiroshima (in the context of the USSR's imminent joining in the Pacific War), or Nagasaki (in the context of Hiroshima). All in perverted service of a greater good. And further imagine Israel thinking (correctly or otherwise) that they're just thiiiis close to killing the tiger once and for all.
Again, I don't affirmatively make (or, for that matter, refuse to make)
situational or moral equivalencies with WWII, or even Iraq for that matter. But certainly there is an equivalency in the way humans attempt to process such a calculation in the heat of the moment.
And that is why the specifics of rules of engagement are critically important, especially in the context of what is objectively known as fact, and what can be constructively guessed at regarding all of the many unknowns.
Naturally, WhoDatPhan78 might (quite rightfully) argue that this leaves aside all of the very relevant arguments about what Israel could/should have done prior to October 7th to avoid this whole mess, and what Israel could/should do in that same space after they achieve their "objectives". But however right that argument might be, it doesn't deal with the present reality. Which, again, is why the details of messy things like rules of engagement are important, and why I asked the question in the first place.