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My longtime friends on this forum know that I occasionally cringe at our propensity to move up in the draft by trading away picks and our refusal to never trade down. Regarding this year's draft, I have no criticism of whom we selected--all three players satisfy needs and seemingly fit our team's culture, and Baun and Trautman arguably went a round later than they should have been picked. But I am critical of how frequently we trade away future picks and of the surrender of four picks to move up from 130 to 105 (traditionally, the middle of the fourth round) to select Trautman.
Prefatorily (and I have statistical data at home that I need to find), every team knows the probability of making a good pick for every position by number in the draft--that is, the probability at, say, pick 68 that the player selected will be an All-Conference player, a Pro Bowl player, a starter for at least two seasons, or a contributor for at least three seasons.
I have looked at how the Saints have drafted since 2006, Payton's first year. I have obviously have had to make some subjective determinations as to whether a player was a good selection. My observations:
--In round 1, our drafting has been extraordinary. We have hit on 14 out of 15 players picked. (I remain critical of the Davenport trade because of the value given up to move up, but I would say that Davenport has been a solid player when he has played and thus is a hit for purposes of this analysis. The only bad pick was Anthony in 2015. Note if a player has been fairly productive, I count that selection as a hit.)
--In round 2, we have hit on 6 of the 9 players picked.
--In round 3, we have hit on 5, and arguably 6, of the 13 players hit. (I am counting Hendrickson as a hit; the number is 6 if you include Tre'Quan Smith.)
--In round 4, we have hit on 4 of the 12 players picked. (I did not count Al Woods as a hit.)
--In round 5, we have hit on 5 of the 14 players picked. (I included Rob Ninkovich as a hit because of his later success.)
--In round 6, we have hit on 0 of the 8 players picked.
--In round 7, we have hit on at least 2 of the 12 players picked (Strief and Colston. I did not include Marcus Murphy, Will Clapp or Kaden Ellis.)
--Regarding the number of hits and draft picks each year, 2006--6 out of 8; 2007--2 out of 7; 2008--3 out of 6; 2009--2 out of 4; 2010--2 out of 6; 2011--2 out of 6; 2012--1 out of 5; 2013--3 out of 5; 2014--1 out of 6; 2015--2 out of 9; 2016--4 out of 5; 2017--6 out of 7; 2018--2 out of 7 (I will include as a hit Smith, but not yet Clapp); and 2019--2 out of 5 (I am not including Ellis).
--Over the last 10 years, our drafting in the middle rounds has not been good.
Based on studies I have seen and decades of watching successful NFL organization build teams, these are my general views on drafting:
1. If a draft produces three really good players--players who are at least consistent starters--the draft has been successful.
2. Teams better hit in the first two rounds and should do well in the third round, especially in the first half of that round. Teams with superior scouting departments can find good players from the late third round through round 5. The odds of finding good players significantly decrease after round 5. (And the statistical studies do not group players by rounds, but by blocks or tiers based on the number of the selection, such as 1-14, 15-22, 23-45, 46-66, and so forth.)
3. Drafting is hard, in part because there is a statistical possibility of failure for every player picked in the draft. There is injury, poor work ethic after a big contract, poor evaluation of a player's physical ability. Most teams try to accumulate draft picks not necessarily to ensure that a large number of players make its roster, but to maximize the chances of a certain number of players making its roster. It is better to draft three players with a 55 percent chance of being a hit rather than 1 player with a 65 percent chance of being a hit. However, a caveat is that special players, especially franchise quarterbacks, are rare. With special players, the trade charts, which are just a general guide, may not apply.
4. No team can claim that it is so talented that only 3 or 4 draft picks can make the roster. Injuries occur. Quality depth is always needed.
My contrary views on how the contrarian Saints operate:
1. Given the talent on our roster and our success over the last three years, if not overall success since 2006, the Saints are doing overall something right, though I am convinced that Payton's favorite song is the Sinatra classic "My Way." The Saints' approach to the draft is a contrarian one, targeting specific players and trading away multiple picks, especially future picks, to trade up. But it is contrary to the statistical studies on how to draft, which is the reason each year you see some teams trying to make as many draft picks as possible. I have no disagreement with occasionally moving up to get a targeted player. But there are times when we need to move down to get more picks, or just to sit where we are and let the draft come to us, which is what we did this year at 24.
2. The Saints are a talented team, but I disagree with the notion that our team is so talented that only a small number of draft picks should be able to make our roster. Every year people say that, and often the Saints have multiple undrafted free agents making the roster. With our three draft selections, we are solid in the lines. But we still need help at wide receiver, and could use quality depth at any number of positions, especially at defensive back, linebacker, and running back. A team can never--never--have too many good players.
3. I have no problem with the three players we picked. I like Ruiz, who I think was a late first-round to early second-round player. There often is not much of a difference in grade between the 24th player and the 40th player. Baun and Trautman could have gone 20 to 30 picks earlier than where they were picked. But we paid the price of 7 draft picks to pick Baun and Trautman--picks 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 in this year's draft and a 3 in 2021. And there are reasons that Baun and Trautman, who at 105 was in effect a fourth-round pick, did not go higher. Again, given where they were drafted, there is a substantial statistical possibility that they will not be quality starters in the future. And each time we trade away future picks, we adversely affect our ability to maneuver in future drafts. Because of the Davenport trade in 2018, we did not have a first-round pick and had to give up our 2019 second-round pick to move up to pick McCoy. Because we did not have our second-round pick this year, we were challenged in this draft.
Prefatorily (and I have statistical data at home that I need to find), every team knows the probability of making a good pick for every position by number in the draft--that is, the probability at, say, pick 68 that the player selected will be an All-Conference player, a Pro Bowl player, a starter for at least two seasons, or a contributor for at least three seasons.
I have looked at how the Saints have drafted since 2006, Payton's first year. I have obviously have had to make some subjective determinations as to whether a player was a good selection. My observations:
--In round 1, our drafting has been extraordinary. We have hit on 14 out of 15 players picked. (I remain critical of the Davenport trade because of the value given up to move up, but I would say that Davenport has been a solid player when he has played and thus is a hit for purposes of this analysis. The only bad pick was Anthony in 2015. Note if a player has been fairly productive, I count that selection as a hit.)
--In round 2, we have hit on 6 of the 9 players picked.
--In round 3, we have hit on 5, and arguably 6, of the 13 players hit. (I am counting Hendrickson as a hit; the number is 6 if you include Tre'Quan Smith.)
--In round 4, we have hit on 4 of the 12 players picked. (I did not count Al Woods as a hit.)
--In round 5, we have hit on 5 of the 14 players picked. (I included Rob Ninkovich as a hit because of his later success.)
--In round 6, we have hit on 0 of the 8 players picked.
--In round 7, we have hit on at least 2 of the 12 players picked (Strief and Colston. I did not include Marcus Murphy, Will Clapp or Kaden Ellis.)
--Regarding the number of hits and draft picks each year, 2006--6 out of 8; 2007--2 out of 7; 2008--3 out of 6; 2009--2 out of 4; 2010--2 out of 6; 2011--2 out of 6; 2012--1 out of 5; 2013--3 out of 5; 2014--1 out of 6; 2015--2 out of 9; 2016--4 out of 5; 2017--6 out of 7; 2018--2 out of 7 (I will include as a hit Smith, but not yet Clapp); and 2019--2 out of 5 (I am not including Ellis).
--Over the last 10 years, our drafting in the middle rounds has not been good.
Based on studies I have seen and decades of watching successful NFL organization build teams, these are my general views on drafting:
1. If a draft produces three really good players--players who are at least consistent starters--the draft has been successful.
2. Teams better hit in the first two rounds and should do well in the third round, especially in the first half of that round. Teams with superior scouting departments can find good players from the late third round through round 5. The odds of finding good players significantly decrease after round 5. (And the statistical studies do not group players by rounds, but by blocks or tiers based on the number of the selection, such as 1-14, 15-22, 23-45, 46-66, and so forth.)
3. Drafting is hard, in part because there is a statistical possibility of failure for every player picked in the draft. There is injury, poor work ethic after a big contract, poor evaluation of a player's physical ability. Most teams try to accumulate draft picks not necessarily to ensure that a large number of players make its roster, but to maximize the chances of a certain number of players making its roster. It is better to draft three players with a 55 percent chance of being a hit rather than 1 player with a 65 percent chance of being a hit. However, a caveat is that special players, especially franchise quarterbacks, are rare. With special players, the trade charts, which are just a general guide, may not apply.
4. No team can claim that it is so talented that only 3 or 4 draft picks can make the roster. Injuries occur. Quality depth is always needed.
My contrary views on how the contrarian Saints operate:
1. Given the talent on our roster and our success over the last three years, if not overall success since 2006, the Saints are doing overall something right, though I am convinced that Payton's favorite song is the Sinatra classic "My Way." The Saints' approach to the draft is a contrarian one, targeting specific players and trading away multiple picks, especially future picks, to trade up. But it is contrary to the statistical studies on how to draft, which is the reason each year you see some teams trying to make as many draft picks as possible. I have no disagreement with occasionally moving up to get a targeted player. But there are times when we need to move down to get more picks, or just to sit where we are and let the draft come to us, which is what we did this year at 24.
2. The Saints are a talented team, but I disagree with the notion that our team is so talented that only a small number of draft picks should be able to make our roster. Every year people say that, and often the Saints have multiple undrafted free agents making the roster. With our three draft selections, we are solid in the lines. But we still need help at wide receiver, and could use quality depth at any number of positions, especially at defensive back, linebacker, and running back. A team can never--never--have too many good players.
3. I have no problem with the three players we picked. I like Ruiz, who I think was a late first-round to early second-round player. There often is not much of a difference in grade between the 24th player and the 40th player. Baun and Trautman could have gone 20 to 30 picks earlier than where they were picked. But we paid the price of 7 draft picks to pick Baun and Trautman--picks 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 in this year's draft and a 3 in 2021. And there are reasons that Baun and Trautman, who at 105 was in effect a fourth-round pick, did not go higher. Again, given where they were drafted, there is a substantial statistical possibility that they will not be quality starters in the future. And each time we trade away future picks, we adversely affect our ability to maneuver in future drafts. Because of the Davenport trade in 2018, we did not have a first-round pick and had to give up our 2019 second-round pick to move up to pick McCoy. Because we did not have our second-round pick this year, we were challenged in this draft.
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