Some nations ground 737 Max 8 planes after second catastrophic crash in five months (1 Viewer)

[wnelson]

pilots said the plane's manual was "criminally lacking basic information" perhaps its time to ground boeing until they get their shirt together

 

[MLU]

pilots said the plane's manual was "criminally lacking basic information" perhaps its time to ground boeing until they get their shirt together

Where did that come from?

 

[Bill]

Correct. They removed the airworthiness certificate last year for B737 with a specific model of GE engines after the Southwest 1380. They did not hesitate to do so and the air carrier was quick to implement corrections. There was no hesitation. This displays just how serious the FAA and US carriers take matters such as these. These people wake up every morning to live and breathe aviation safety and they enjoy nearly unfettered authority to do so.

They're not betting. They have confirmed it. US pilots and pilot training groups do not bet.

Knowing and remembering is what they do and have done for years by the time they're flying a B737 for a US carrier. Pilots like Chesley Sullenberger and Tammi Jo Shults do not possess otherworldly abilities. They are just as highly trained as the rest of the pilots flying their aircraft type. They all take it just as serious as those two do. It's not luck that either of those two were flying that day because almost any of their co-workers would have responded in kind. I would go so far as to say it's beyond knowing and remembering and more reacting as if the aircraft is an extension of their bodies.

That's why they have two of them. That's also why they have rigorous and continuous training, evaluations, shared responsibilities with Aircraft Dispatchers and resources available in the cockpit to assist with solving problems.

Well, they have yet to publish come to a conclusion and publish findings, but it's my understanding that human error had a huge role in the first accident. The crew fought the MCAS instead if turning them off.



Boeing then released a bulletin.
The bulletin specifically mentions the feature to override the MCAS system if necessary.


I am not a commercial airline pilot, but I have taken and passed the ADX exam which is basically the ATP exam required for commercial airline pilots. This has been a hot topic at work, despite the fact that m,y company does not operate this aircraft type. I am far from a subject matter expert here on this specific topic. I have had one conversation with two pilots of a US air carrier that does operate this aircraft type who acknowledged that they can understand how this could have happened and agree the pilots will likely be found at fault. Poor training, poor candidates, complacency, hazardous attitudes, etc could have had a role here. In the case of the Lion Air accident, there have been questions about the maintenance records so that's something else that could be a factor as well.

It's waaaaaay too early to tell what the final cause will be (I can't emphasize that enough), but everything right now seems to point to pilot error.

Excellent comments all around.

With regard to the Lion Air crew, it would be important to me to know what (if anything) they knew about potential problems with the MCAS system. If the problem was common enough to have had a procedure in place for disabling & overriding their crippled system, then the report will likely attach a greater level of responsibility to them for not carrying out the bulletin. But either way, as the last humans to have a chance to save their aircraft, that crash will likely be given 'pilot error' status. However the final report will likely give details about what they should have known about the issue they faced and what steps they should have taken based on the information of the flight data recorders and voice recorder... and possibly even the weather conditions at the time. It will also be noted what was actually happening in regard to the physical position of the control surfaces, particularly the elevator.

But as you inferred, it's unlikely that either of these crews will be completely exonerated unless every known corrective action was taken and the aircraft still did not respond.

 

[MLU]

Excellent comments all around.

With regard to the Lion Air crew, it would be important to me to know what (if anything) they knew about potential problems with the MCAS system. If the problem was common enough to have had a procedure in place for disabling & overriding their crippled system, then the report will likely attach a greater level of responsibility to them for not carrying out the bulletin. But either way, as the last humans to have a chance to save their aircraft, that crash will likely be given 'pilot error' status. However the final report will likely give details about what they should have known about the issue they faced and what steps they should have taken based on the information of the flight data recorders and voice recorder... and possibly even the weather conditions at the time. It will also be noted what was actually happening in regard to the physical position of the control surfaces, particularly the elevator.

But as you inferred, it's unlikely that either of these crews will be completely exonerated unless every known corrective action was taken and the aircraft still did not respond.

To be clear, I don't think the MCAS system has a problem. It's a new system on a familiar aircraft. It sounds like it behaved as programmed. The issue may have been that it was behaving correctly to incorrect data, if that makes sense. It can't tell if other components failed and to ignore the data. It can only act on the information supplied to the programming and it sounds like it did. It sounds as if the AOA sensors failed or provided erroneous data. The pilots not responding properly may have compounded the issue and made it worse.

I could have read incorrectly, but I recall the FO for the Ethiopian Air flight had less than 500 total hours. The Captain had several thousand. Both pilots for Lion Air had several thousand hours of flying time. Now, not much of that flying time could be relevant to this specific accidents because we're not sure how much time they had in this aircraft type with the MCAS system.

 

[Rickboy]

Just as a point of order...the 737 Max family is not a true fly by wire aircraft.
Spoiler control is but primary flight controls are not.
That being said, there obviously is some computer controls in play, especially in regards to pitch control.
Boeing changed the aerodynamic characteristics of the 737 when they created the Max series.
At certain AOA the aircraft has a tendency to pitch up, due in part to the engines being larger and mounted further ahead of and slightly higher than the wing.
To get around this problem, they incorporated MCAS (Maneuvering Chatateristics Augmentation System) which is just really an antistall system.
MCAS tries to keep the nose from pictching up but still allowing normal maneuvers. Erroneous AOA input will make the system behave improperly. If the pilot doesn’t recognize what is going on then it could result in a crash due to an pilot and MCAS fighting each other.
The Lion Air crash included accusations of Boeing not really putting enough information out there about MCAS while some other airlines disputed that.
We will know more in the coming days.

Do you know if the Max7,9, or 10 have the same issue?

 

[Saint_Ward]

Trump: These new fangled planes got too much tech-a-nology in 'em.

Says the man flying one of the most complex planes in the world.

 

[Bill]

To be clear, I don't think the MCAS system has a problem. It's a new system on a familiar aircraft. It sounds like it behaved as programmed. The issue may have been that it was behaving correctly to incorrect data, if that makes sense. It can't tell if other components failed and to ignore the data. It can only act on the information supplied to the programming and it sounds like it did. It sounds as if the AOA sensors failed or provided erroneous data. The pilots not responding properly may have compounded the issue and made it worse.

I could have read incorrectly, but I recall the FO for the Ethiopian Air flight had less than 500 total hours. The Captain had several thousand. Both pilots for Lion Air had several thousand hours of flying time. Now, not much of that flying time could be relevant to this specific accidents because we're not sure how much time they had in this aircraft type with the MCAS system.

Chances are that the MCAS system itself is not the problem. It is likely just responding to the way it is deciphering the data... which is possibly a software issue. But if the data from the AOA sensor is erratic (for whatever reason) or if it is outside the parameters the software needs to operate/adjust properly, then the whole system needs to be evaluated for where the discrepancies are occurring. There is certainly ample reason to make sure they figure it out and get it right sooner than later.

 

[superchuck500]

Do you know if the Max7,9, or 10 have the same issue?

It is my understanding the whole Max line has the issue, but no one is talking about those. Maybe they don’t.

 

[staphory]

Do you know if the Max7,9, or 10 have the same issue?

No reason they wouldn’t, the max family have the same engine mounted in the same configuration.
I think this boils down to pilot error, possibly due to lack of training.
Many aircraft have these sorts of systems that are designed to help the pilot fly the aircraft.
Faulty sensors happen and as a result these systems behave abnormally as a result of bad data. It’s up to the pilot to recognize abnormal operation and react to it. As MLU said, US and European pilots are highly trained and are frequently retrained on their aircraft.
Other countries sometimes are not.

 

[Saint_Ward]

No reason they wouldn’t, the max family have the same engine mounted in the same configuration.
I think this boils down to pilot error, possibly due to lack of training.
Many aircraft have these sorts of systems that are designed to help the pilot fly the aircraft.
Faulty sensors happen and as a result these systems behave abnormally as a result of bad data. It’s up to the pilot to recognize abnormal operation and react to it. As MLU said, US and European pilots are highly trained and are frequently retrained on their aircraft.
Other countries sometimes are not.

I think that is the issue though. How much training did the airlines do? Boeing basically sold this as a "you don't need to be re trained, because it flies the same". Now, that doesn't mean the airlines didn't go ahead and train their pilots on the small differences.

It gets into the argument of requirements vs choices.

 

[Bill]

It is my understanding the whole Max line has the issue, but no one is talking about those. Maybe they don’t.

One of the huge hurdles for aircraft designers is to come out with an aircraft that fit the needs of the airline companies primarily regarding their profit margin. Naturally these designs must also be mechanically reliable because you can't make money with a 'hanger queen'.

Updating the already proven design of the 737 series has been the best way to go for Boeing. Instead of trying to reinvent the wheel, there is a distinct advantage for a carrier that already has a large number of 737s (from both and operations and a maintenance standpoint) to purchase the upgraded models. But of course as other manufacturers vie for a piece of that market, their success comes from offering new designs that can do the job safer and cheaper. (Possibly with a little more emphasis on the latter, since commercial flying is already statistically very safe.)

When a design comes out with improvements such as better fuel efficiency, quieter engines, greater seating capacity, reduced maintenance times and tasks, and sometimes even faster cruise speeds, an air carrier has little choice but to take notice of the benefits of these improvements and they will invest accordingly. But just because an aircraft with upgrades may look basically the same, it is still a 'new' airplane in many ways.

For example, when Boeing began to hang bigger and more powerful engines under the wings after the 737-100 & 200 series, they also needed better yaw stability by adding a dorsal section to the vertical fin which helps control the adverse yaw in the event the crew is forced to fly on one engine. But as each 'new & improved' model came out with even greater power and efficiency ratings, so did the need to improve the airframe. The fin and rudder is now even taller than the original design as a result of these engine updates.

But more than anything these improved engine designs affect things like how the air flows over the wing and how power changes during normal flight operations affect the 3-axes of flying... pitch, roll, & yaw. One only needs to look out of the concourse window to see how these (physically) larger engines are having to be 'shoe-horned' under the wings of the 737 airframe. The engine nacelles are no longer symmetrically round at the intake, but rather flattens along the bottom . And since they can't just put a 'lift kit' on the gear, the centerline of these engines need to be raised. Thus the engineering requires a mounting design that can no longer keep the top of the engine cowl below the wing. In fact it's been pointed out here already that the top of the nacelles on these new engines now align above the wing's leading edge chord line.

This does not necessarily mean that it's bad (or dangerous) for the design. It simply means the airflow over the wings has changed and undoubtedly affects the flying characteristics throughout the range of power settings differently than what those older & smaller engines did. Though I personally don't know the wing design changes over the years (outside of those obvious fuel-saving winglets), it's a 'no-brainer' to conclude that the wings had to have some updates to work well with the new engines.

Besides the 'bottom line' of the airline companies, these types of changes clearly affect the flying characteristics of the different 737 models and will have a bearing on the operation of the aircraft from a human pilot standpoint as well as the programmed computerized systems that were created to improve performance and safety on every flight.

 

[superchuck500]

Apparently at least five different pilots filed notice with FAA over the past months noting difficulties with the 737 Max aircraft. I think this info cuts both ways - it shows that a trained and experienced pilot can handle the problem without incident. But it shows that the issue is showing up, it's not a fluke occurrence.

 

[mt15]

Canada has now grounded them, the US is alone in the world still flying these planes. Sigh.

I think I also saw where Canada won’t let them in their airspace either.

 

[superchuck500]

Canada has now grounded them, the US is alone in the world still flying these planes. Sigh.

I think I also saw where Canada won’t let them in their airspace either.

At this point, it’s a huge gamble for Boeing and the FAA. If a domestic Max flight crashes or has a serious incident, there will be absolute hell to pay. They must be confident it won’t be a problem for US pilots . . . or foolish to the point of reckless.

The tort liability alone would be dramatic - as the facts support enhanced culpability (willful conduct versus ordinary negligence).

 

[DaveXA]

What's not clear to me is whether the pilots need better training or the MCAS system needs to be fixed, or both?

At this point, it’s a huge gamble for Boeing and the FAA. If a domestic Max flight crashes or has a serious incident, there will be absolute hell to pay. They must be confident it won’t be a problem for US pilots . . . or foolish to the point of reckless.

The tort liability alone would be dramatic - as the facts support enhanced culpability (willful conduct versus ordinary negligence).

Yeah, it seems to me they're better off grounding the planes and getting this right. They're essentially staking their company on being "right" when it's probably not something worth risking to begin with. It just seems tone deaf to me. They may be right, and nothing happens, but that's a heck of a risk to take in this climate.