bclemms
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goverment is the biggest criminals. when do we get to takes DNA samples from them
Pretty sure every hooker in DC has that covered.
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goverment is the biggest criminals. when do we get to takes DNA samples from them
We, as citizens, always tend to view these things as slippery slopes . . . but I think the Court typically brings us back to the existing frameworks we already live in. Cops can't just take your fingerprints or do a drug screen based on a typical traffic stop. We already have that analysis in place based on the Fourth Amendment. So that's the answer to your question . . . they can't do that.
Not sure I agree with you. They already allow drug-sniffing dogs at routine traffic stops. They already allow roadside DUI checkpoints where they stop you without probable cause and do sobriety tests or breathalyzers. It's not far from there to DNA swabs at traffic stops.
wouldn't DNA be used the same way? If prints are okay why not the DNA?
Just curious
A suspect’s criminal history is a critical part of his identity that officers should know when processing him for detention. It is a common occurrence that “[p]eople detained for minor offenses can turn out to be the most devious and dangerous criminals. Hours after the Oklahoma City bombing, Timothy McVeigh was stopped by a state trooper who noticed he was driving without a license plate. Police stopped serial killer Joel Rifkin for the same reason. One of the terrorists involved in the September 11 attacks was stopped and ticketed for speeding just two days before hijacking Flight 93.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 14) (citations omitted). Police already seek this crucial identifying information. They use routine and accepted means as varied as comparing the suspect’s booking photograph to sketch artists’ depictions of persons of interest, showing his mugshot to potential witnesses, and of course making a computerized comparison of the arrestee’s fingerprints against electronic databases of known criminals and unsolved crimes. In this respect the only difference between DNA analysis and the accepted use of fingerprint databases is the unparalleled accuracy DNA provides.
Actually, under the Maryland law the DNA sample doesn't go to the database until after arraignment and is supposedly "destroyed" and removed from the database if the person is acquitted.
The Court didn't really address this aspect of it in its rationale, but it is an interesting point. I suspect that, like fingerprints, a law that didn't similarly require destruction could still be upheld but this case certainly doesn't stand for that proposition.
Another interesting point about the Maryland law that the Court upheld was that it provided express limitations on how the DNA could be used. For instance, using DNA to make "familial matches" was prohibited. This seems like a well-reasoned safeguard by the Maryland lawmakers to try to recognize that it raises additional questions when you try to use the validly-obtained DNA from one person to try to convict a family member whose DNA was not obtained and that use is presumably beyond the valid purpose in obtaining the DNA initially.
The Court did not really go into this aspect either.
Actually, under the Maryland law the DNA sample doesn't go to the database until after arraignment and is supposedly "destroyed" and removed from the database if the person is acquitted.
The Court didn't really address this aspect of it in its rationale, but it is an interesting point. I suspect that, like fingerprints, a law that didn't similarly require destruction could still be upheld but this case certainly doesn't stand for that proposition.
Another interesting point about the Maryland law that the Court upheld was that it provided express limitations on how the DNA could be used. For instance, using DNA to make "familial matches" was prohibited. This seems like a well-reasoned safeguard by the Maryland lawmakers to try to recognize that it raises additional questions when you try to use the validly-obtained DNA from one person to try to convict a family member whose DNA was not obtained and that use is presumably beyond the valid purpose in obtaining the DNA initially.
The Court did not really go into this aspect either.
wouldn't DNA be used the same way? If prints are okay why not the DNA?
Just curious
What you are talking about - fingerprints being used to search for other crimes without any probable cause or warrant to do so - has not been okayed by the SCOTUS. Scalia points this out in the dissent.
Courts have long held that you cannot just willy nilly search people without a warrant, which requires probable cause, or some exigent circumstance to do so.
This ruling clearly goes against it which explains why the majority wants to characterize the DNA swab/testing as a method of identification as opposed to a search. Even though there is little to no basis in fact to do so.
Let's make sure we're consistent with our terms and contexts. I don't think the opinion stands for the proposition that DNA can be taken without probable cause. The majority clearly prefaces the endorsement of the practice only in the context of processing an arrest - and the Court (perhaps too liberally) presumes probable cause already exists based on the arrest. In other words, I think the holding could be read to mean that the "search" that is the DNA swab in the context of arrest processing has probable cause co-extensive with the probable cause supporting the arrest (and ergo, if the arrest is found to lack probable cause the swab would likewise have been improperly taken).
But the other point - using any sort of identifying data against a criminal database of unsolved crimes - does appear to be endorsed by the majority but it does so with no citation and it appears to be dicta . . . simply recognizing this common law enforcement practice.
So based on this discussion and knowing my learned friend in Tennessee orange knows this area well better than I, it leads me to ask whether the Court's apparent acceptance of the idea that identifying data taken from an arrested person (e.g. fingerprints or DNA) can be legally compared against identifying data from unsolved crimes is not actually the case and that the practice has been held to violate the arrestee's rights?
Actually, under the Maryland law the DNA sample doesn't go to the database until after arraignment and is supposedly "destroyed" and removed from the database if the person is acquitted.
The Court didn't really address this aspect of it in its rationale, but it is an interesting point. I suspect that, like fingerprints, a law that didn't similarly require destruction could still be upheld but this case certainly doesn't stand for that proposition.
Another interesting point about the Maryland law that the Court upheld was that it provided express limitations on how the DNA could be used. For instance, using DNA to make "familial matches" was prohibited. This seems like a well-reasoned safeguard by the Maryland lawmakers to try to recognize that it raises additional questions when you try to use the validly-obtained DNA from one person to try to convict a family member whose DNA was not obtained and that use is presumably beyond the valid purpose in obtaining the DNA initially.
The Court did not really go into this aspect either.
The opinion says that a DNA search can be taken without regard to any individualized suspicion - which in effect means without any probable cause for criminal behavior.
Surely you are not naive enough to believe this. I can assure you, no DNA sample will ever be destroyed.
I don't think it says that. I says that a DNA swab can be taken as part of processing of an arrested person. The probable cause for the search is co-extensive with the probable cause for the arrest.
The only way they could get to the holding is either using an individualized suspicion standard - which would require probable cause - or to use a reasonableness standard, which is what they used hence the discussion over identification.
The legitimate government interest served by the Maryland DNA Collection Act is one that is well established: the need for law enforcement officers in a safe and accurate way to process and identify the persons and possessions they must take into custody. It is beyond dispute that “probable cause provides legal justification for arresting a person suspected of crime, and for a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps incident to arrest.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 113–114 (1975).
Also uncontested is the “right on the part of the Government, always recognized under English and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested.” Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 392 (1914), overruled on other grounds, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961). “The validity of the search of a person incident to a lawful arrest has been regarded as settled from its first enunciation, and has remained virtually unchallenged.” United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 224 (1973). Even in that context, the Court has been clear that individual suspicion is not necessary, because “[t]he constitutionality of a search incident to an arrest does not depend on whether there is any indication that the person arrested possesses weapons or evidence. The fact of a lawful arrest, standing alone, authorizes a search.” Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U. S. 31, 35 (1979).
The “routine administrative procedureat a police station house incident to booking and jailing the suspect” derive from different origins and have different constitutional justifications than, say, the search of a place, Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U. S. 640, 643 (1983); for the search of a place not incident to an arrest depends on the “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place,” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 238 (1983). The interests are further different when an individual is formally processed into police custody. Then “the law is in the act of subjecting the body of the accused to its physical dominion.” People v. Chiagles, 237 N. Y. 193, 197, 142 N. E. 583, 584 (1923) (Cardozo, J.). When probable cause exists to remove an individual from the normal channels of society and hold him in legal custody, DNA identification plays a critical role in serving those interests.